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OPINION OF THE COURT 
 
AMBRO, Circuit Judge 
 
Alexander Sambolin appeals from an order of the United 
States District Court for the Eastern District of 
Pennsylvania dismissing his claim as untimely. As a result 
of the dismissal, Sambolin's claim fails to qualify for 
compensation pursuant to the multidistrict class action 
settlement agreement (the "Settlement Agr eement") between 
the Appellees -- AcroMed Corporation ("Acr oMed") and the 
Plaintiffs' Legal Committee ("PLC")-- approved by the 
District Court in In re: Orthopedic Bone Screw Products 
Liability Litigation, 176 F.R.D. 158 (E.D. Pa. 1997). On 
appeal, Sambolin presents three ar guments that the 
District Court improperly denied him participation in the 
mandatory, non-opt-out settlement class. He first 
maintains that the District Court abused its discr etion in 
denying him participation in the settlement under the 
equitable doctrine of "excusable neglect," a doctrine whose 
label we find unnecessarily pejorative her e but whose 
principles are nonetheless relevant. Sambolin next argues 
that the settlement's registration deadline, under which his 
claim is untimely, violates the equal protection and 
procedural due process protections of the Fifth and 
Fourteenth Amendments. His final contention on appeal is 
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that the court-approved notice program in this class action 
was deficient under the standards of Federal Rule of Civil 
Procedure 23 and due process. 
 
We forgo ruling on the constitutional challenges, for we 
conclude that the District Court's ruling was inconsistent 
with the exercise of sound discretion in denying Sambolin 
participation in the settlement solely for his failure to 
comply with the registration deadline imposed. We 
recognize that deadlines are an integral component of 
effective consolidation and management of the modern 
mass tort class action. See, e.g., In r e Gypsum Antitrust 
Cases, 565 F.2d 1123, 1127 (9th Cir . 1977). Yet rigid and 
unquestioned adherence to such limitations belies 
principles of equity and the court's role as afiduciary in 
class actions when allowing a claimant participation in a 
settlement works no harm on the conduct of the 
proceedings and does not significantly pr ejudice the 
interests of the parties. In the circumstances this case 
presents, we reverse the District Court's order denying 
Sambolin participation in the AcroMed settlement. 
 
I. JURISDICTION 
 
The District Court exercised diversity jurisdiction over 
this multidistrict litigation matter pursuant to 28 U.S.C. 
SS 1332(a) and 1407. In re: Orthopedic Bone Screw Prods. 
Liab. Litig., 176 F.R.D. 158, 171 (E.D. Pa. 1997). The order 
denying Sambolin participation in the settlement is a final 
decision of the District Court conferring jurisdiction on this 
Court pursuant to 28 U.S.C. S 1291. 
 
II. FACTS 
 
The circumstances surrounding the pedicle bone screw 
litigation and resulting settlement by Acr oMed have 
received more complete and eloquent exposition in other 
opinions than is required in this appeal. See, e.g., In re: 
Orthopedic Bone Screw Prods. Liab. Litig., 193 F.3d 781, 
784-87 (3d Cir. 1999). As a result, we cover only the 
highlights and how they pertain to Sambolin's claims. 
 
The multidistrict litigation of orthopedic bone scr ew 
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products liability claims has been directed by the nine- 
member PLC, which agreed, in December 1996, to settle 
with one of the principal manufacturers of bone screws -- 
AcroMed. Under the terms of the Settlement Agreement,1 
AcroMed agreed to create a fund of $100 million, plus the 
proceeds of the bulk of its insurance policies, in return for 
a complete release from liability by the certified class.2 
Because the $100 million exceeded AcroMed's ear nings or 
net assets at the time, it was obtained by monetizing 
AcroMed's future earnings and was conditioned on the 
resolution of this action. The District Court granted 
mandatory, non-opt-out class certification under Fed. R. 
Civ. P. 23(b)(1) and preliminarily appr oved the Settlement 
Agreement on January 16, 1997 in Pretrial Order ("PTO") 
No. 724.3 In re: Orthopedic Bone Screw Prods. Liab. Litig., 
No. M.D.L. 1014, 1997 WL 303242 (E.D. Pa. January 16, 
1997) (hereinafter "PTO 724"). The Court's final approval of 
the Settlement Agreement followed on October 17, 1997. In 
re: Orthopedic Bone Screw, 176 F .R.D. at 186. 
 
The class certified in the settlement included all persons 
who underwent surgical implanting of Acr oMed bone 
screws through December 31, 1996, a gr oup estimated by 
the parties to exceed 100,000. Id. at 170-71, 173. These 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
1. Though the Settlement Agreement was the subject of frequent revision, 
none of its provisions relevant to this appeal were changed. 
 
2. Under the Settlement Agreement, the r eleased parties include AcroMed 
and any treating physicians and hospitals who might be liable on a 
products liability theory. "However, claims for independent medical 
malpractice against these physicians and hospitals will not be dismissed 
under the settlement." In re: Orthopedic Bone Screw, 176 F.R.D. at 166. 
 
3. Though not directly pertinent to this appeal, it should be noted that 
the District Court's grant of certification r easoned that AcroMed had a 
"limited fund" with which to meet the demands of plaintiffs. In re: 
Orthopedic Bone Screw, 176 F.R.D. at 177. Since that ruling, the "limited 
fund" of a defendant to meet claims has been substantially 
circumscribed by the Supreme Court as a basis for the maintenance of 
a class action. See Ortiz v. Fibreboar d Corp., 527 U.S. 815 (1999) (when 
a mandatory class action is certified on a limited fund theory, the fund 
must be limited independently of the parties' agr eement). Before the 
ruling in Ortiz, the appeal of the settlement's approval in this case was 
voluntarily dismissed. 
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class members were required by the Settlement Agreement 
to file two documents to perfect their rights to recovery. 
First, it required claimants to file a Registration Form by 
May 1, 1997 to participate in the settlement. PTO 724, 
P 12. The Registration Form requir ed, inter alia, listing the 
claimant's name, address, age, Social Security number, 
legal representation and date and type of bone screw 
surgery. Second, the Settlement Agreement required the 
filing of a Proof of Claim form, which was to be drafted by 
the later-appointed Claims Administrator to permit an 
equitable distribution of the settlement fund. The Claims 
Administrator was appointed in January 1998 and a Pr oof 
of Claim form was agreed on by the parties and approved 
by the Court on January 6, 1999. PTO 1655. The Pr oof of 
Claim form contained extensive release and indemnity 
terms and required claimants to describe and document 
their medical histories with the AcroMed bone screws in 
some detail. It further stated that it must be mailed to the 
Claims Administrator postmarked no later than April 15, 
1999. The Court was unequivocal in its statement of the 
consequence of a failure to file timely both forms. 
"Settlement Class Members who are Acr oMed Orthopedic 
Bone Screw Recipients and who do not timely Register and 
submit Claims Forms are not entitled to share in the 
AcroMed Settlement Fund, [and] ar e . . . barred and 
enjoined from asserting Settled Claims." PTO 724, P 12. 
 
Nevertheless, neither of the deadlines for the two forms 
escaped postponement. The May 1, 1997 Registration Form 
deadline was pushed back until May 15, 1997 due to 
administrative difficulties caused by receiving and 
processing the large volume of registrations. Almost two 
years later, the Proof of Claim deadline was delayed twice, 
cumulatively from April 15, 1999 until June 15, 1999, to 
remedy the difficulties of many claimants documenting 
their injuries. PTO 1802. 
 
Pretrial Order No. 724 also approved the settlement's 
notice procedures. The Settlement Agr eement required the 
PLC to mail a settlement notice and the Registration Form 
to known class members, primarily persons who had 
already filed suit against AcroMed or who had identified 
themselves to the PLC by responding to a series of 
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advertisements placed by various plaintiffs' attorneys. This 
group was comprised of 6,949 persons who wer e either 
class members or related claimants. The Settlement 
Agreement further provided for additional constructive 
notice in certain newspapers. Pursuant to the Court's order 
and the Settlement Agreement, formal notice was published 
during January and February 1997 as follows: twice in USA 
Today, a national newspaper with a cir culation of 1.9 to 2.4 
million; once in TV Guide, a national magazine with a 
circulation of 13 million; once in Parade Magazine, a 
national Sunday newspaper insert with a circulation of 81 
million; and once in "a Spanish-language newspaper of 
general circulation in Puerto Rico." PTO 724, P 8. The 
Puerto Rican newspaper chosen was El Nueva Dia , 
published in San Juan, Puerto Rico. The notice in El Nueva 
Dia ran on January 24, 1997 in small text on page 50. The 
publication notice published in each of the periodicals 
contained basic information about the settlement, including 
the May 1, 1997 Registration Form deadline, and the 
address of the PLC where potential class members could 
write for more information. Other than the PLC's address, 
the notice listed no other means to receive further 
information, no telephone number (toll-fr ee or otherwise) 
and no internet address. Purportedly as a result of the 
published notice, the PLC received 1,457 r equests for 
further information or registration for ms by late April 1997. 
 
Sambolin lives outside Luquillo, a seaside village on the 
Northeast coast of Puerto Rico. He had AcroMed pedicle 
screws implanted in his spine on April 3, 1995 4 to treat 
recurring back pain. Sambolin's initial r ecovery went well, 
but six weeks following the surgery he experienced severe 
back pain. Physicians later diagnosed the pain as the result 
of one loose and one broken AcroMed scr ew, and both were 
extracted in June 1996. According to Sambolin, the 
AcroMed screws caused him severe pain and ongoing 
medical difficulties. Sambolin communicated with attorneys 
in Puerto Rico at some point in 1997, but they failed to 
inform him of the settlement. Later that year , he spoke with 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
4. Because the settlement class includes all r ecipients of AcroMed 
pedicle 
screws before December 31, 1996, it is undisputed that Sambolin is 
within the certified class. 
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a Miami attorney who apprised him of the class action and 
settlement and helped him prepare the necessary 
paperwork. Without delay, the settlement Registration Form 
was signed on December 16, 1997, and subsequentlyfiled 
with the Claims Administrator, approximately seven months 
after the May 1 deadline stated in the notices and r epeated 
on the Registration Form. 
 
In September 1998, the Claims Administrator submitted 
the Proposed Plan of Settlement Administration (the 
"Proposed Plan") for the Court's appr oval. Among other 
details, the Proposed Plan stated that class members who 
failed to submit the Registration Form by the May 1997 
deadline were subject to a 20% reduction in award "points," 
and not total disqualification from participation in the 
settlement. Withholding judgment on the Pr oposed Plan, 
the District Court approved the Proof of Claim form 
accompanying the Plan on January 6, 1999. PTO 1655. It 
then was disseminated to all settlement registrants, 
whether timely or not. 
 
Sambolin filed his Proof of Claim on February 10, 1999, 
well before the initial April 15, 1999 deadline. Shortly 
afterward, he requested of the Claims Administrator that 
the 20% reduction in the Proposed Plan be waived as to his 
claim because the notice of the registration deadline was 
deficient. On February 22, 1999, the District Court issued 
PTO 1722, which rejected the 20% discounting pr ovision of 
the Proposed Plan and reasserted its position in PTO 724 -- 
that May 1, 1997 was an absolute deadline for r egistration, 
as stated in the notices and on the Registration For m. The 
Court did, however, extend the registration deadline to May 
15, 1997 to remedy any receipt date pr oblems encountered 
by the large numbers of registrations r eceived by the PLC 
during that period. The absolute deadline for r egistration of 
May 15, 1997 was restated again in PTO 1757, but the 
Court in this order also permitted late r egistrants, such as 
Sambolin, to show cause to the Claims Administrator why 
their claims should be deemed timely. 
 
Sambolin responded to the show cause or der with a one- 
page statement asserting ignorance of the settlement and 
lack of notice. That response was rejected by the Claims 
Administrator. Sambolin protested his exclusion from the 
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settlement in a motion filed with the Court r equesting relief 
from PTO 1722. That motion, which is the subject of this 
appeal, was considered at a November 22, 1999 status 
conference and was rejected by the Court in PTO 1870 
without comment. 
 
In PTO 1930 the District Court addressed, in bulk, the 
validity of claims presented by untimely r egistrants in their 
appeal from the Claims Administrator's r ejection of their 
claims. In re: Orthopedic Bone Scr ew, C.A. No. 97-381, 2000 
WL 1023782 (E.D. Pa. July 10, 2000). That or der addresses 
the claims of 168 class members who failed to file the 
Registration Form by May 15, 1997 and who r esponded to 
the show cause order of PTO 1757, including Sambolin. 
The Court first rejected claims that the settlement's notice 
provisions were inadequate under Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(b)(1) 
and related principles of due process. Id. at *9. It further 
applied the "excusable neglect" standar d we later address 
in this opinion and permitted eight persons to participate in 
the settlement under its rationale. Id. at *11. All of the eight 
late registrants included in the settlement suf fered from 
debilitating medical disabilities that prevented the timely 
perfection of their claims. Id. 
 
According to the Claims Administrator, there have been 
534 late filings of the Registration Form as of February 14, 
1999. Between 243 and 306 of these arrived befor e 
Sambolin's Registration Form in December 1997. According 
to the PLC's records, there ar e 104 claimants in Sambolin's 
predicament -- an untimely Registration For m but a timely 
Proof of Claim. Assuming that Sambolin's statements in his 
Proof of Claim are accurate, the Claims Administrator has 
estimated his gross award at $33,000, subject to 
deductions for legal fees and potential subr ogation claims. 
 
III. DISCUSSION 
 
We undertake circumspectly our r eview of the District 
Court's exercise of its equitable authority to excuse the late 
filings, as the District Court's application of those powers is 
only reviewable by this Court for an abuse of discretion. 
See In re Cendant Corp. Prides Litig., 233 F.3d 188, 192 (3d 
Cir. 2000) (hereinafter "Cendant Prides I"); In re: Gypsum 
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Antitrust Cases, 565 F.2d at 1128; cf. Dominic v. Hess Oil 
V.I. Corp., 841 F.2d 513, 516 (3d Cir. 1988) (employing an 
abuse of discretion standard to the r eview of a grant of 
extension of time to serve process). We refrain from 
substituting our judgment for that of the District Court 
insofar as its holding is reasonable and supported by the 
evidence. "The test is not what this court would have done 
under the same circumstances; that is not enough. The 
court must feel that only one order could have been entered 
on the facts." Gypsum Antitrust, 565 F .2d at 1128; see also 
Rode v. Dellarciprete, 892 F .2d 1177, 1182 (3d Cir. 1990) 
(finding an abuse of discretion "when no r easonable person 
would adopt the district court's view"). "W e will therefore 
not disturb an exercise of discretion`unless there is a 
"definite and firm conviction that the court below 
committed a clear error of judgment in the conclusion it 
reached upon a weighing of the relevant factors.' "" Hanover 
Potato Prods., Inc. v. Shalala, 989 F .2d 123, 127 (3d Cir. 
1993) (citing Ferrero, U.S.A., Inc. v. Ozak Trading, Inc., 952 
F.2d 44, 48 (3d Cir. 1991) (citation omitted)). "An appellate 
court may find an abuse of discretion wher e the `district 
court's decision rests upon a clearly err oneous finding of 
fact, an errant conclusion of law or an impr oper application 
of law to fact.' " In re Gen. Motors Corp. Pick-up Truck Fuel 
Tank Prods. Liab. Litig., 55 F .3d 768, 783 (3d Cir.) (citing 
International Union, UAW v. Mack T rucks, Inc., 820 F.2d 91, 
95 (3d Cir. 1987), cert. denied, 499 U.S. 921 (1991)) 
(hereinafter "GM Truck"), cert. denied sub. nom., Gen. 
Motors Corp. v. French, 516 U.S. 824 (1995). 
 
A. 
 
In reviewing the District Court's order denying Sambolin 
participation in the settlement, we are hamper ed by the 
summary treatment given his claim by the Court. It chose 
not to explain its reasoning in denying Sambolin's motion, 
stating only that "Sambolin's Motion . . . for Relief from 
Pretrial Order No. 1722 is DENIED." (PTO 1870). Generally 
we require further explanation of an or der terminating a 
litigant's claim. See Interpace Corp. v. City of Philadelphia, 
438 F.2d 401, 404 (3d Cir. 1971) ("[I]t is a salutary practice 
to give the litigants, either orally or in writing, at least a 
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minimum articulation of the reasons for its decision."). 
Indeed, as we commented in Cendant Prides I,"[w]e have 
imposed a duty of explanation on District Courts when they 
conduct `excusable neglect' analysis." Cendant Prides I, 233 
F.3d at 196 (citing Chemetron Corp. v. Jones, 72 F.3d 341, 
350 (3d Cir. 1995)). Yet we must acknowledge that the 
District Court realized that it would face a bevy of 
substantially similar claims in response to its show cause 
order. As such, we will adopt, wher e relevant, the Court's 
later analysis of these claims, see In r e: Orthopedic Bone 
Screw Prods. Liab. Litig., C.A. No. 97-381, 2000 WL 
1023782 (E.D. Pa. July 10, 2000) (PTO 1930), as it applies 
with equal force, and with the same result, to Sambolin's 
case. 
 
Settlement administration in a complex class action often 
requires courts to use their equitable powers under Rule 23 
to manage the disparate interests competing over a finite 
pool of assets with which to satisfy the class. As stated in 
the Manual for Complex Litigation, "[t]he equitable powers 
of the court may be invoked to deal with other pr oblems 
that commonly arise during administration of the 
settlement." Manual for Complex Litigation (Thir d) S 30.47 
(1995) (the "Manual"). These equitable powers are retained 
by the court until the settlement fund is actually 
distributed. See Zients v. LaMorte, 459 F .2d 628, 630 (2d 
Cir. 1972). A primary use of these equitable powers is 
balancing the goals of expedient settlement distribution and 
the consideration due to late-arriving class members. 
Compare Georgine v. Amchem Prod., Inc., No. 93-0215, 1995 
WL 251402, *5 (E.D. Pa. Apr. 26, 1995) ("This Court has an 
interest in enforcing its deadlines and ensuring that this 
litigation finally comes to a conclusion.") with the Manual 
S 30.47 ("Adequate time should be allowed for late claims 
before any refund or other disposition of settlement funds 
occurs."). Integral to this balancing, however , is the court's 
responsibility and "inherent power and duty to protect 
unnamed, but interested persons." Zients , 459 F.2d at 630. 
The Second Circuit in Zients likened those claimants 
excluded from recovery in a class action to "wards of the 
court," id., and we have similarly stated that "the court 
plays the important role of protector of the absentees' 
interests, in a sort of fiduciary capacity." GM Truck, 55 F.3d 
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at 784; see also In re Cendant Corp. Prides Litig., No. 99- 
5555, 2001 WL 276677, at *6 (3d Cir. Mar ch 21, 2001). 
Though we were speaking more generally in GM Truck 
about the court's approval of class counsel and evaluation 
of the settlement's fairness, the aggr egate nature of the 
class action in no way implies that the court'sfiduciary 
duties to the whole class are somehow gr eater or more 
important than its duties to the individual members of the 
class. 
 
The district courts of this Circuit have fr equently 
analyzed late claims in class actions under the rubric of 
whether the claimant has shown "excusable neglect." See In 
re Cendant Corp. Prides Litig., 189 F .R.D. 321, 324 (D.N.J. 
1999); Valente v. Pepsico, Inc., 89 F .R.D. 352, 359 (D. Del. 
1981); Georgine, 1995 WL 251402, at *3. There is authority 
for the correctness of doing so. See Super markets Gen. 
Corp. v. Grinnell Corp., 490 F.2d 1183, 1186 (2d Cir. 1974). 
Indeed, this Court recently announced in a pair of decisions 
from the Cendant Prides litigation that the "excusable 
neglect" standard, as announced in the Supr eme Court's 
ruling in Pioneer Inv. Servs. v. Brunswick Assoc. Ltd. P'ship, 
507 U.S. 380 (1993), provides the analysis for consideration 
of untimely claims for inclusion in a class action settlement.5 
Cendant Prides I, 233 F.3d at 196; In re Cendant Corp. 
Prides Litig., 235 F.3d 176, 180 (3d Cir . 2000) (hereinafter 
"Cendant Prides II"). 
 
Thus we begin with Pioneer, in which the Supreme Court 
addressed excusable neglect in the context of Fed. R. 
Bankr. P. 9006(b)(1), governing the enlargement of time for 
filing of proofs of claim in bankruptcy cases. The Court in 
Pioneer noted that the genesis of the bankruptcy rule was 
found in Fed. R. Civ. P. 6(b), which gover ns the 
enlargement of time periods in the civil rules. Pioneer, 507 
U.S. at 391. It stated that 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
5. Though the opinions in both Cendant Prides I and Cendant Prides II 
were not released until after oral ar gument in this matter, we find that 
neither opinion substantially alters the analysis suggested by the parties 
-- namely, whether Sambolin could demonstrate"excusable neglect" 
under the considerations announced in Pioneer . 
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       in applying Rule 6(b), the Courts of Appeals have 
       generally recognized that "excusable neglect" may 
       extend to inadvertent delays. Although inadvertence, 
       ignorance of the rules, or mistakes construing the rules 
       do not usually constitute "excusable" neglect, it is clear 
       that "excusable neglect" under Rule 6(b) is a somewhat 
       "elastic concept" and is not limited strictly to omissions 
       caused by circumstances beyond the contr ol of the 
       movant. 
 
Id. at 391-92 (citations omitted). As such, Pioneer rejected 
the holding of some courts of appeal that the benefit of 
excusable neglect could only be employed wher e late filing 
was due to circumstances beyond the contr ol of the party. 
Id. at 387. This analysis eschews any per se  rule that 
excusable neglect is unavailable to a party whose untimely 
filing was due to circumstances within his or her control.6 
See Cendant Prides I, 233 F.3d at 196. Indeed, in Cendant 
Prides II this Court excused the late filing of a class action 
proof of claim form where the "r eason for the delay . . . was 
either unforeseeable sabotage by mailroom employees who 
purposely misled [the claimant], or even mor e simply, a 
mailroom which did not operate as it should have in the 
ordinary course of business." Cendant Prides II, 235 F.3d at 
183. 
 
The fault of the untimely party is not our only 
consideration in determining whether a claimant should 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
6. It also bears noting that while fault does not necessarily invalidate a 
claim of "excusable neglect," the analysis applies with equal force on the 
other end of the spectrum -- to those whose untimely filing was entirely 
faultless. "Excusable neglect," then, is not an entirely proper label for 
the 
scope of inquiry available under its rationale. As the Court observed in 
Pioneer, the "ordinary meaning of `neglect' is `to give little attention 
or 
respect' to a matter, or closer to the point for our purposes, `to leave 
undone or unattended to esp[ecially] through carelessness.' " Pioneer, 507 
F.2d at 388 (citing Webster's Ninth New Collegiate Dictionary 791 (1983)) 
(emphasis in original). Thus, even though "neglect" is normally perceived 
negatively to connote carelessness in pursuit of a claim, it also 
"encompasses . . . simple, faultless omissions to act." Id. While 
"neglect" 
may not be an apt term to describe those situations in which the failure 
to file timely is entirely faultless, the principles extracted from the 
doctrine of "excusable neglect" apply nonetheless. 
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have the benefit of excusable neglect. Pioneer  noted the 
following four factors: 1) the danger of prejudice to the 
nonmovant; 2) the length of the delay and its potential 
effect on judicial proceedings; 3) the r eason for the delay, 
including whether it was within the reasonable control of 
the movant; and 4) whether the movant acted in good faith. 
Pioneer, 507 U.S. at 395; see also Cendant Prides I, 233 
F.3d at 196. We earlier stated, while discussing excusable 
neglect in the context of Fed. R. Civ. P. 4 (regarding time for 
issuing service), that the District Court should inquire into 
six factors. See Dominic v. Hess Oil V.I. Corp., 841 F.2d 513, 
517 (3d Cir. 1988). 
 
       1) whether the inadvertence reflected pr ofessional 
       incompetence such as ignorance of rules of pr ocedure, 
       2) whether an asserted inadvertence reflects an easily 
       manufactured excuse incapable of verification by the 
       court, 3) counsel's failure to provide for a readily 
       foreseeable consequence, 4) a complete lack of 
       diligence or 5) whether the inadvertence resulted 
       despite counsel's substantial good faith efforts towards 
       compliance . . . . Moreover, we also consider whether 
       the enlargement of time will prejudice the opposing 
       party. 
 
Id. (citing Consol. Freightways Corp. of Del. v. Larson, 827 
F.2d 916, 919 (3d Cir. 1987)). These six factors, announced 
in Dominic before Pioneer was decided, present a more 
specific application of the general considerations later 
announced by the Supreme Court in Pioneer . We 
commented in Cendant Prides I that the Dominic factors 
that were not restated in Pioneer were instead subsumed in 
the more general consideration of "r eason for the delay." 
Cendant Prides I, 233 F.3d at 196 n.8. 
 
Lacking any allegations of professional incompetence in 
this case, it seems less important to focus on the 
"inadvertence" of counsel which concer ned the Court in 
Dominic. Consequently, for purposes of applying excusable 
neglect principles to Rule 23, we will employ the four 
factors announced in Pioneer to Sambolin's claim. 
 
B. 
 
We cannot agree with the District Court that Sambolin 
should be excluded from the settlement class simply 
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because he failed to meet the May 15, 1997 r egistration 
deadline. Rather, we are convinced in these circumstances 
that Sambolin has adequately pursued his claim against 
AcroMed in good faith and with reasonably timely efforts 
since learning of the settlement. Under these facts, we find 
that each factor of the Pioneer analysis counsels in favor of 
including Sambolin within the settlement class and that the 
Court abused its discretion in excluding him fr om sharing 
in the remedy. 
 
i. The Danger of Prejudice to the Non-Movant 
 
Consideration of the prejudices created by including 
Sambolin's claim within the settlement class is a unique 
inquiry, for while the expansion of the plaintif f class in the 
ordinary class action will be to the detriment of the 
defendant, here the liability of AcroMed has been capped by 
the Settlement Agreement at over $100 million. Inclusion of 
Sambolin's claim, and those of others similarly situated, 
has no effect on the amount AcroMed will pay to those 
aggrieved by its products. The prejudice to AcroMed by 
counting Sambolin's claim is similar to that in the closed- 
end class action in Cendant Prides II, in which this Court 
noted that inclusion of another claimant within the class 
will do no detriment where the scope of the defendant's 
liability has already been fixed. Cendant Prides II, 135 F.3d 
at 184 ("The Court found that Cendant would not be 
harmed because the original limits of Cendant's financial 
obligation had not been expanded."). Indeed, in Cendant 
Prides II (unlike here) Cendant would have received as a 
windfall any diminution in claims caused by a plaintiff 's 
exclusion from the class. "In truth, since the only 
`prejudice' Cendant would suffer by being forced to pay [the 
claimant] is the `loss of a windfall,' we conclude that 
Cendant will suffer no prejudice at all." Id. AcroMed would 
not receive any similar windfall in this case, and thus it has 
no argument that it will be prejudiced by Sambolin's 
recovery. 
 
More generally, we find it appropriate to consider the 
effect of Sambolin's inclusion on those whom it might 
prejudice -- namely those members of the settlement class 
who filed their registrations by the May 15, 1997 deadline. 
It cannot be maintained that timely registrants are more 
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deserving of remedy, for purposes of equity, than tardy 
registrants with similar claims, presuming the failure to 
register on time was indeed blameless. By excluding 
Sambolin and other similarly situated late r egistrants from 
the class, the timely registrants would r eceive what is 
essentially a "windfall," comprised of some portion of the 
recovery that would be owed to the otherwise deserving late 
registrants. As noted in Cendant Prides II , the loss of a 
windfall is not prejudicial. Cendant Prides II, 235 F.3d at 
184. 
 
Even if we were to assume, arguendo , Sambolin's 
recovery prejudices other class members, there are only 
approximately 100 claimants who, like Sambolin, failed to 
file a timely Registration Form but didfile the Proof of 
Claim form by the twice-extended June 15, 1999 deadline. 
Assuming all of these claimants present valid claims for 
inclusion in the class, which is by no means certain, they 
would still represent only a minuscule fraction of the total 
settlement class, estimated at 4,412 bone scr ew recipients, 
1,424 consortium claims and 1,109 subrogation claims. 
Further assuming that the claims of these 100 ar e similar 
in magnitude, and thus damages, to the remainder of the 
settlement class, it cannot reasonably be ar gued that the 
effect of their inclusion is anything but mar ginal. See 
Zients, 459 F.2d at 630. 
 
ii. Length of the Delay and its Effect on Judicial 
       Proceedings 
 
Sambolin's Registration Form was signed andfiled on 
December 16, 1997, approximately seven months following 
the May 15, 1997 registration deadline. His Pr oof of Claim 
form, detailing the extent of his injury and other details 
necessary to resolve his claim, was filed February 10, 1999, 
approximately two months before the initial deadline for 
that document, April 15, 1999, and over four months before 
the revised deadline of June 15, 1999. Relevant here is the 
seven month delay in filing the Registration For m and what 
effect that delay wrought on the pr oceedings. 
 
In its quixotic attempt to show that the delay was 
unreasonably long and substantially affected the conduct of 
these proceedings, the PLC argues that the early 
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registration deadline served an important purpose in 
settlement administration. Among the justifications 
proffered in support of the May 15, 1997 deadline are that 
it helped define the class of persons to be included in the 
settlement for the final fairness hearing and facilitated the 
efforts of the Claims Administrator in pr eparing 
mechanisms for the eventual distribution of the settlement 
fund. We have substantial doubts, however , that these 
factors motivated the selection of the May 15, 1997 
deadline, as the District Court granted preliminary approval 
to the settlement before publication notice was even given.7 
Furthermore, the Claims Administrator was not appointed 
until January 30, 1998, more than a month after 
Sambolin's Registration Form was filed. 8 
 
Whatever the purpose of the May 1997 registration 
deadline, focus on its rationale evades the r elevant inquiry 
here: how Sambolin's failure to comply with that deadline 
will deter the expedient and just resolution of claims. It is 
uncontested that the PLC continued to receive and process 
Registration Forms throughout 1997 and 1998. 
Furthermore, the process of winnowing the valid claims 
from the invalid, and the compensable claims fr om the 
uncompensable, did not even begin until the 1998 
appointment of the Claims Administrator and the appr oval 
of a Proof of Claim form thereafter . We also find it telling 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
7. We also note on this point that the date of the fairness hearing was 
April 23, 1997, a week before the first deadline for receipt of the 
Registration Form. 
 
8. The Claims Administrator further attempts to justify the registration 
deadline by reasoning that the early deadline aided subrogation 
claimants' subsequent identification of their claims. While this may, 
indeed, have been a beneficial outcome of the r egistration deadline post 
hoc, we find interesting that the initial Settlement Agreement fixed one 
deadline for both bone screw recipients and subrogation claimants. Thus 
the fact that subrogees were later given the opportunity to "piggyback" 
their claims on those of individual claimants initially could not have 
justified the May 1, 1997 deadline. Nevertheless, given that the 
subrogees have long been aware of the identity of those bone screw 
recipients (like Sambolin) whose recovery was precluded by their 
noncompliance with the deadline, his later inclusion in the settlement 
class will not unduly prejudice the ability of subrogees to "piggyback" on 
those late registrants who filed timely Pr oof of Claim forms. 
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that the Claims Administrator's Proposed Plan would have 
included untimely registrants, with only a 20% reduction in 
the "points" used to allocate equitably the settlement fund. 
While we do not review the District Court's eventual 
rejection of that Plan provision, we cannot ignore the fact 
that, as of September 1998, the Claims Administrator 
tacitly acknowledged both that inclusion of late r egistrants 
was neither prohibitively difficult nor unjust to those who 
met the Proof of Claim deadline. 
 
The PLC contends that we should look back fr om our 
current vantage point in assessing the influence on the 
proceedings of Sambolin's seven month delay. That is, the 
PLC suggests that we should measure the delay's effects on 
the proceedings as of the present and not the delay's effects 
on the proceedings when that delay was ended by 
Sambolin's registration. As long as distribution of the 
limited fund settlement remains pending, we r eject this 
contention. Such a rule would be unfair, for the delay 
caused by the adjudication of the late claim, and not the 
lateness of the claim itself, would often give sufficient 
reason to reject the claim regar dless of the effect of the 
movant's actual delay. Moreover, consideration of the 
current effect of the delay on the pr oceedings would conflict 
with our holding that the length of the delay should be 
considered in absolute terms and not by r eference to the 
import of intervening circumstances. In r e O'Brien Envtl. 
Energy, Inc., 188 F.3d 116, 130 (3d Cir. 1999) (holding that 
the relevant time period is the delay between the date the 
bankruptcy claim should have been filed and the date it 
was filed, and that the Pioneer analysis should not be 
affected by the significance of the intervening approval of 
the reorganization plan and the debtor's expedited 
schedule). 
 
Even if we were to consider the length of Sambolin's 
delay and its effect on judicial proceedings as of today, we 
are unpersuaded that including Sambolin within the 
recovering class would cause great dislocation in the 
current administration of the settlement. While the PLC 
exhorts that "myriad" administrative issues would arise 
from the recalculation of the limited fund, this claim is 
unsupported. The Claims Administrator was able to 
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calculate a hypothetical recovery for Sambolin's claim quite 
easily in his brief to this Court. Furthermor e, as of the 
current process of the litigation, class members have only 
been told the number of points they are entitled under the 
Settlement Agreement and can appeal the Claims 
Administrator's determination of those points. Those 
appeals have as much potential to upset the curr ent 
distribution of claims as the inclusion of Sambolin and 
other similarly situated claimants. At oral ar gument, the 
Claims Administrator himself noted that distribution of the 
settlement had not occurred and, even if distribution began 
before resolution of this case, the awar ds could be 
structured in a manner that would allow for the inclusion 
of later-allowed untimely registrants. Given these facts, we 
believe that any hindrance in settlement fund 
administration caused by inclusion of Sambolin's claim is 
too minimal to justify exclusion of his claim on that basis.9 
"We conclude that where, as her e, all the equities are on 
the side of the claimants, the fund has not been distributed 
and the administration of the fund would be insignificantly 
hampered by allowing these few late claims, appellants 
should be permitted to participate in the fund." Zients, 459 
F.2d at 630-31.10 
 
In considering the effect on the proceedings, we find that 
cases applying excusable neglect concepts to the time 
limitation for "opting out" of a Rule 23(b)(3) class action are 
conversely distinguishable from the cir cumstances here -- 
essentially "opting in" to a closed-end settlement fund. See 
Georgine v. Amchem Prods., Inc., Civ. A. No. 95-0215, 1995 
WL 251402 (E.D. Pa. April 26, 1995). Geor gine considered 
the untimely requests to opt out of the class action 
asbestos settlement. Relying on In re Four Seasons Sec. 
Laws Litig., 59 F.R.D. 667, 677 (W .D. Okl. 1973), the court, 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
9. We caution that our conclusion on this point might be different had 
Sambolin not made a timely filing of the Pr oof of Claim. The Proof of 
Claim contained the bulk of the information vital to settlement 
administration, including the timing, nature, and severity of the injury 
and information necessary to the identification of interested subrogees. 
 
10. The PLC's attempt to distinguish the Second Circuit's holding in 
Zients on the basis that distribution of the settlement fund is imminent 
is hardly convincing in this case. 
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in rejecting the excusable neglect argument of the movants, 
expressed its opinion that "[a] too liberal application of 
[excusable neglect] in class actions would undermine the 
finality of judgments entered therein and would discourage 
settlement of such actions." Georgine , 1995 WL 251402, at 
*6 (quoting Four Seasons). While this r esult in Georgine had 
a compelling rationale in that case, Sambolin desir es the 
opposite result: inclusion in a settlement that will otherwise 
bar his remedy. As such, Sambolin's claim for inclusion in 
an opt-in class action lacks the potentially detrimental 
effect on the process of settlement fr om which a claim for 
exclusion from an opt-out class action suf fers. 
 
iii. Reason for the Delay 
 
Sambolin's seven month delay in filing his Registration 
Form resulted from his lack of awar eness, in light of the 
minimal constructive notice provided by the parties, that 
his right to a remedy was being litigated in a binding class 
action. Though we do not at this time opine as to the 
constitutional sufficiency of the notice pr ovided under Rule 
23 and Mullane v. Central Hanover Bank & T rust, 339 U.S. 
306, 314-15 (1950) (requiring notice "r easonably calculated, 
under all the circumstances, to apprise inter ested parties of 
the pendancy of the action and afford them an opportunity 
to present their objections"), we do note that, absent actual 
notice mailed to his address, it is incongruous, in the 
unique circumstances of this case, to find Sambolin 
culpable for his failure to note a small advertisement run 
once on page 50 of a newspaper he does not r eceive.11 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
11. Because notice issues of this type ar e recurring in the district 
courts, 
we would be remiss if we did not express our concerns about the notice 
program used in this class action and suggest some better practices, 
especially in the wake of the Supreme Court's discussion of Rule 
23(b)(1)(B) limited fund mandatory class actions in Ortiz v. Fibreboard 
Corp., 527 U.S. 815 (1999). In Ortiz, the Court expressed skepticism that 
Rule 23(b)(1)(B) limited fund class actions ar e valid at all under Rule 
23, 
and stated that, if these class actions were to be valid, they would have 
to conform closely to the contours of traditional limited fund cases that 
predated Rule 23. See id. at 842-44, 864. The Court noted that one of 
the important characteristics of traditional limited fund cases was a 
certain level of notice: "[T]raditional limited fund actions typically 
provided notice to all claimants and the opportunity for those claimants 
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Indeed, in Zients the Second Circuit found that the 
plaintiffs' failure to make a timelyfiling for inclusion in a 
class action settlement was blameless, despite the fact that 
actual notice had been mailed to them through their 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
to establish their claims before the actual distribution took place." Id. 
at 
841 n.19. The Court then strongly implied that a Rule 23(b)(1)(B) 
mandatory limited fund class action had to meet the same procedural 
requirements as to notice as Rule 23(b)(3) actions: "It is simply 
implausible that the Advisory Committee, so concer ned about the 
potential difficulties posed by dealing with mass tort cases under Rule 
23(b)(3), with its provisions for notice and the right to opt out, see 
Rule 
23(c)(2), would have uncritically assumed that mandatory versions of 
such class actions, lacking such protections, could be certified under 
Rule 23(b)(1)(B)." Id. at 844. Thus, Ortiz seems to imply (although it 
specifically declined to rule) that the level of notice required for a 
settlement like AcroMed's is the same as is r equired in a Rule 23(b)(3) 
action: the best notice practicable, "including individual notice to all 
members who can be identified through reasonable effort." Fed R. Civ. P. 
23(c)(2). Cf. Phillips Petroleum v. Shutts, 472 U.S. 797, 811-12 (1985) 
(holding that "[i]f the forum State wishes to bind an absent plaintiff 
concerning a claim for money damages or similar relief at law," the 
notice given "must be the best practicable"). 
 
Sambolin's brief lists the following ways that the notice program in this 
case could have been easily improved thr ough more directed attempts to 
determine the identities of class members who were not mailed 
individual notice. First, the PLC and AcroMed could have asked the 
hospitals and doctors who purchased the bone screws for a list of their 
patients who had bone screws implanted, as they would presumably 
have these records on file. The PLC could also have sent out a general 
"Dear Doctor" letter to the orthopedic medical community, explaining the 
settlement and enclosing notice packets. Finally, the PLC could have 
placed ads in orthopedic trade publications asking doctors for help in 
identifying the names and addresses of Acr oMed bone screw recipients. 
We agree that likely all of these methods would have substantially 
increased the PLC's database of class members, and some combination 
of them would have constituted a reasonable ef fort to identify individual 
class members. 
 
AcroMed argues that hospitals and doctors should not be used as 
notice distributors because giving notice was against their interests, as 
they might themselves have been targets of lawsuits. This argument is 
unconvincing. First, the AcroMed settlement immunized doctors and 
hospitals from AcroMed bone screw pr oducts liability lawsuits (though 
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broker. Zients, 459 F.2d at 630. Similarly, in Cendant 
Prides I, this Court held that the district court acted within 
its discretion in excusing the late filings of several 
claimants where the stated reasons included, among 
others, "the failure of claimants to r eceive notice." Cendant 
Prides I, 233 F.3d at 197. 
 
In considering the reason for the delay, we ar e not 
constricted in examining the conduct of the claimant which 
contributed to the delay, but may examine as well whether 
the notice given by the PLC also contributed to the delay. 
See In re O'Brien, 188 F.3d at 129. In In re O'Brien this 
Court stated that "although [the claimant] was careless in 
not reading the Application carefully, and specifically, 
paragraphs fourteen through sixteen, his neglect is 
excusable since it was caused at least in part by[the 
debtor's] own failure to properly alert[the claimant] that 
this `application' was really an objection to its claim." Id. 
Though the Court there was discussing the clarity of 
written notice, we find Sambolin's predicament to be 
analogous. The constructive notice given to him was too 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
not malpractice actions), so notice was not entir ely against their 
interests. Second, Sambolin notes that ther e have been many other 
similar notice programs that have involved entities distributing notice 
when it was possibly against their interests to do so. For example, in 
securities class action lawsuits, brokers ar e routinely used to 
distribute 
notice, even when they are potential tar gets of the lawsuit. 
 
Sambolin also lists ways in which the publication notice could have 
been substantially improved, asserting that the publication could have 
been much broader, using a mix of national and local publications. 
Additionally, Sambolin submits that the PLC could have placed notices 
on the internet, run radio and television advertisements, and undertaken 
a free media campaign involving public service announcements. The 
content of the notice publication could also have been improved. For 
example, it could have contained a simple tear -off registration form, and 
included an 800 number for obtaining registration materials, both of 
which would have made registration much easier . The notice also did not 
warn readers of the serious consequences of missing the registration 
deadline: losing one's right of action with no chance to share in the 
settlement fund. While all of these efforts may not be required by due 
process, we are inclined to believe that some combination of them would 
help to bring the notice program closer to"the best notice practicable." 
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minimal to impart blame upon him for his lack of 
awareness. 
 
In its later rejection of the excusable neglect claims of a 
group of late registrants, including Sambolin, the District 
Court more fully explained its application of the Pioneer 
standard to those claimants and, we believe, incorrectly 
found Sambolin and others blameworthy for their failure to 
become aware of the settlement. See In r e: Orthopedic Bone 
Screw, C.A. No. 97-381, 2000 WL 1023782 (E.D. Pa. July 
10, 2000) (PTO 1930). Responding to the Court's show 
cause order, the group of 168 class members who failed to 
file the Registration Form by May 15, 1997 argued for 
inclusion within the settlement class. Refer encing Pioneer, 
the Court permitted only eight persons to participate in the 
settlement, all of whom suffered fr om medical disabilities 
that prevented the timely perfection of their claims. While 
we do not purport to address the claims of all of those 168 
class members, at least with respect to Sambolin's 
inclusion within that group we must examine the District 
Court's analysis of the Pioneer considerations. In setting 
out those considerations, the District Court stated: 
 
       The central feature of the court's deter mination in each 
       of these cases is that the person's disability or other 
       problem was a prohibitive factor in their[sic] attempt 
       to perfect their [sic] claim on a timely basis. In 
       contrast, although other persons demonstrated the 
       extent of their disability and pain, the court could not 
       conclude as a factual matter that the injured person's 
       failure to prosecute a timely claim was caused by their 
       [sic] injury, disability or other impediment. 
 
PTO 1930, at *11. By focusing on whether the person's 
injury prohibited the timely filing of his or her claim, the 
Court's considerations turned wholly on whether the 
claimant's failure to file the claim by May 15, 1997 was due 
to medical circumstances beyond the contr ol of the 
claimant, and not on other equitable considerations such 
as the prejudice to other claimants or potential effect on 
judicial proceedings. Furthermore, there is no consideration 
of whether the actions of the PLC or AcroMed contributed 
to the delay. See In re O'Brien, 188 F.3d at 129. By making 
the medical status of the claimants in May of 1997 
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dispositive of their excusable neglect claims, the Court 
misapplied the holding of Pioneer that excusable neglect is 
an "elastic concept" and is "not limited strictly to omissions 
caused by circumstances beyond the contr ol of the 
movant." Pioneer, 507 U.S. at 392. Failing to inquire 
beyond the health status of the claimant in deter mining the 
reason for the delay was error. 
 
iv. Whether the Movant Has Acted in Good Faith 
 
Given the equitable nature of our inquiry, it is of course 
true that the movant must demonstrate good faith or 
otherwise seek the relief of the court with clean hands. See 
Gaudiosi v. Mellon, 269 F.2d 873, 881 (3d Cir. 1959). No 
party has alleged that Sambolin exhibited less than good 
faith in seeking redress for his injury. He acted responsibly 
and with alacrity to secure a remedy for the pain allegedly 
caused to him by the pedicle screw surgery. See Cendant 
Prides II, 235 F.3d at 184. Absent any further evidence that 
Sambolin's failure to apprise himself seasonably of the 
settlement was the result of anything other than ignorance 
that his rights were being litigated in a non-opt-out class 
action under Rule 23(b)(1), we find that Sambolin has 
displayed good faith in his pursuit of class inclusion. 
 
IV. CONCLUSION 
 
Because we find that the District Court did not perform 
a balancing of the equitable factors of excusable neglect in 
determining Sambolin's exclusion from the settlement 
class, and because none of the equitable factors support 
the District Court's result, we conclude that its holding was 
necessarily in error. Applying the Pioneer factors to the 
facts of this case, we cannot conclude that the Court 
correctly considered the equities of Sambolin's claim for 
inclusion in the settlement class. While "[t]here is no 
question that in the distribution of a large class action 
settlement fund, `a cutoff date is essential and at some 
point the matter must be terminated,' " In re Gypsum 
Antitrust Cases, 565 F.2d at 1127 (citation omitted), 
application of this principle must not be so rigid as to 
preclude recovery by a deserving claimant. See Zients, 459 
F.2d at 631. 
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Because we conclude the District Court's ruling was 
inconsistent with the exercise of sound discr etion in 
excluding Sambolin from the settlement class, we do not 
reach Sambolin's other claims of error in this appeal. 
 
* * * 
 
For the foregoing reasons, we reverse the judgment of the 
District Court in that portion of Pretrial Or der No. 1870 
denying Sambolin participation in the settlement class, and 
remand for further proceedings consistent with this 
opinion. 
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